President Vladimir Putin has introduced a new Military Doctrine in the context of the Ukraine crisis, deteriorating relations with the United States, the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), as well as shifts within the international security environment. However, the doctrine appears innately defensive in its tone and content, offering some adjustments to the 2010 Military Doctrine, but retaining most of its core elements. The new doctrine notes Russia’s strategic interests in the Arctic and introduces a reference to non-nuclear deterrence (2014 Military Doctrine, December 26, 2014).
According to the presidential website, the decision to order a new Military Doctrine was taken on July 5, 2013, during a meeting of the Russian Security Council. Therefore, the revision of the 2010 Military Doctrine began prior to the Ukraine crisis and could not have been driven solely by that crisis. On the other hand, Putin’s instruction to the Security Council in September 2014 to complete the drafting of the new doctrine within three months was most likely influenced by the Ukraine crisis and the US and NATO response—including the Western-imposed sanctions regime, the exclusion of Russia from the G20, and the North Atlantic Alliance freezing its relations with Moscow. A meeting of the Security Council on December 19, 2014, considered and approved the new doctrine, which was signed into law on by President Putin on December 26 (Kremlin.ru, December 26, 2014).
Putin’s decision to accelerate the drafting of the Military Doctrine prompted widespread speculation concerning the intentions that might be signalled in the revised version of the security document. This included the country’s nuclear posture, threats and dangers to the state and whether the 2014 doctrine would label the US and NATO as enemies. Russian experts, however, urged caution and forecast a revision of the doctrine that would be inherently defensive. The nuclear posture would remain unchanged and only minor changes were being considered. If anything, the new incarnation of the Military Doctrine represented an opportunity to correct some aspects in line with the organizational transformation in the Russian military (Voyenno Promyshlennyy Kuryer, December 17, 2014; Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye, December 15, 2014).
On December 26, these Russian experts were proven correct in their assessment: the nuclear posture is unchanged, in fact it removes the reference to nuclear weapons in the context of regional conflict contained in the 2010 doctrine, and leaves much of the original threat assessment unchanged (2014 Military Doctrine, December 26, 2014; 2010 Military Doctrine, February 5, 2010). Viktor Baranets, a military expert and commentator for Komsomolskaya Pravda, also highlighted the defensive nature of the 2014 Military Doctrine and its consistency with the earlier version. The doctrine anticipates closer military cooperation between Russia and former Soviet Republics, as well as with China, India and Latin America. Special emphasis in this regard is placed on Belarus, Abkhazia and South Ossetia (LifeNews, December 30).
The 2010 doctrine made a distinction between opasnosti(dangers) and ugrozy(threats) facing Russia. This permitted Moscow to continue to oppose NATO enlargement (rather than the Alliance as such) and out-of-area operations without designating it as a threat. This distinction is preserved in the 2014 doctrine (2014 Military Doctrine, December 26, 2014; 2010 Military Doctrine, February 5, 2010). The 2014 doctrine describes the international security environment as follows: “World development is characterized at the present stage by a strengthening of global competition and of tension in various areas of inter-state and inter-regional interaction, by the rivalry of values and models of development, by instability of economic and political development processes at global and regional levels against the background of a general complication of international relations. There is a phased redistribution of influence in favor of new centers of economic growth and political gravitation” (2014 Military Doctrine, December 26, 2014).
To the list of external military threats the new doctrine adds: “[the] establishment of regimes in states contiguous with the Russian Federation, including as a result of the overthrow of legitimate state authorities, and having a policy threatening interests of the Russian Federation; subversive activities of special services and organizations of foreign states and their coalitions against the Russian Federation” (2014 Military Doctrine, December 26, 2014). In section II.15 on the features of modern military conflicts, it adds: “[the] participation of irregular armed force elements and private military companies in military operations; use of indirect and asymmetric methods of operations; use of political forces and public movements financed and controlled from outside” (2014 Military Doctrine, December 26, 2014).
In section III, the 2014 Military Doctrine adds, “Employment of the Armed Forces, other troops, and entities in peacetime shall be by decision of the President of the Russian Federation in accordance with the procedure established by federal legislation. The Armed Forces, other troops and entities shall be employed decisively, purposefully and comprehensively based on advance and constant analysis of the military-political and military-strategic situation taking shape” (2014 Military Doctrine, December 26, 2014).
By far the most intriguing shift in the new doctrine is found in section I.8, which refers to a system of non-nuclear deterrence: “system of nonnuclear deterrence—a complex of foreign-policy, military, and military-technical measures aimed at preventing aggression against the Russian Federation by non-nuclear means” (2014 Military Doctrine, December 26, 2014). This was signalled in earlier interviews by Army-General Yury Baluyevskiy, the former chief of the General Staff, who noted that Russia needs a system of non-nuclear deterrence; which appears to be a culmination of theoretical military thinking on “pre-nuclear deterrence” (EDM, November 18, 2014). Despite its inclusion in the doctrine it remains unclear as to how this may be developed in practical terms.
Russia’s 2014 Military Doctrine offers no tangible support to those who argue that Moscow has adopted a more aggressive military posture. The doctrinal revisions are modest, stepping back from designating the US or NATO as military threats, while expressing concern about potential crisis escalation. Since 2010, the Arab Spring, the deterioration of security in the Middle East and North Africa, as well as the NATO exit from Afghanistan influenced Russian doctrinal thinking. In terms of the Ukraine crisis and US/NATO relations with Russia, the doctrine offers some insight into how Moscow views the international order in late 2014. Nonetheless, since oil prices have fallen and the ruble has suffered decline against the dollar, it is likely that the new doctrine will prove to be largely aspirational. In short, it offers no answer to the “guns or butter” question now plaguing the Kremlin.
--Roger McDermott
Russia’s Defense Doctrine Reflects Putin’s Paranoia and Siege Mentality
Moscow published its new Military Doctrine on December 26, 2014 (Kremlin.ru, December 26, 2014). And without going into the details (see accompanying article), clearly this document reflects the mentality of a state under siege on all fronts. Moreover, almost all of the multiple threats listed in the doctrine had long since been outlined and stated in the Russian press by one or another official. Indeed, on December 10, Chief of the General Staff, General Valery Gerasimov, said, “Attempts to pressure our country are being made [by the West and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization] in all vitally important spheres.” These activities, he asserted, comprise efforts to reduce Russia’s military-economic potential, slow down its scientific-technological development in strategically important areas, and increase NATO’s military presence near Russia’s borders, among others (Interfax, December 10, 2014).
These, along with other identified threats found their way back into the 2014 version of the Russian Military Doctrine. Even though some are listed as “dangers” rather than “threats” (probably for political reasons), there does not seem to be any fundamental policy distinction (in fact rather than in rhetoric) between these terms. The following are listed as threats or dangers to Moscow: missile defense, or efforts to nullify the offensive potential of Russian nuclear forces; NATO’s “buildup” near Russia’s borders; the US concept of prompt global strike; activities that undermine patriotism; growth in global terrorism and radicalism; informational influence on the Russian population “with a view to undermine the historical and patriotic traditions”; threats to Russia’s Arctic energy and defense interests and installations; foreign funding of domestic political forces and public movements; private military companies on Russian borders; armed action in neighboring countries; and the weaponization of outer space (Kremlin.ru, December 26, 2014).
Considering this wide list of both internal and external threats, as well as Moscow’s repeated assertions that threats to the Russian state abound and are growing, the latest iteration of the country’s Military Doctrine in many ways echoes a Stalinist mentality. Besides overt and indirect allusions to capitalist or imperialist encirclements, the document also paints links between domestic and foreign enemies. Moreover, Russia’s Military Doctrine describes an ideological and strategic state of siege between the West and Russia. Not surprisingly, therefore—and quite unlike the US national security concept or defense doctrine—the Russian 2014 document devotes enormous attention to issues of mobilization of the country and economy for war (Kremlin.ru, December 26, 2014). And, in the hoary tradition of Russian proclamations, such tools and weapons are precisely those Russia has used, uses, and will use against its enemies in the West, if not elsewhere.
Beyond the 2014 Military Doctrine’s all-encompassing threat assessment, there are other interesting and occasionally dangerous signs for the West within this document. On the one hand, the doctrine seems to continue Russia’s trend of restricting its nuclear operations and eschews any talk of a justification for a preemptive nuclear strike. Yet, on the other hand, it does reflect Russia’s growing confidence in its newly acquired high-tech conventional arsenal by introducing the concept of “non-nuclear deterrence.” This concept, associated with several Russian thinkers like Andrei Kokoshin, means that Russia believes it no longer needs to resort as quickly to a first nuclear strike if it is thrown on the defensive (Kremlin.ru, December 26, 2014). Almost counter-intuitively, this could entail more danger for Europe if Russia’s confidence in its conventional military arm grows.
The 2014 Military Doctrine fully lives up to the Russian habit of blaming the mirror for a bad reflection. Although the document was finalized over the course of 2014, nowhere does the new doctrine talk about Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Nor does the document ever mention Moscow’s military superiority in the Baltic theater. Beyond that, the 2014 doctrine also provides further reason to expect a Russian incorporation of Georgia’s provinces of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as the document expressly discusses defense cooperation with both of them.
China also deserves to be discussed in relation to the new Russian Military Doctrine. The document proposes to “coordinate [Russian] efforts [with China] to deal with military risks in the common space of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization [SCO].” It also provides for the creation of joint missile defense systems. While Moscow has pursued this with the West in the past, pledges of a joint system with Beijing could serve as a warning to NATO or the US.
Analysts like Dmitri Trenin deny that Moscow is seeking an alliance with China (Cer.org.uk, February 13, 2012). However, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu explicitly said in Beijing that Russia and China confront not only US threats in the Asia-Pacific but also US-orchestrated “color revolutions” and Islamic terrorism. Therefore, the “issue of stepping up this cooperation [between Russia and China] has never been as relevant as it is today,” he noted (Interfax, November 18, 2014). Specifically, Russia’s defense minister meant enhanced Sino-Russian security cooperation (through unspecified means), both bilaterally and within the SCO. Both Shoigu and his deputy minister, Anatoly Antonov, decried US policies in Central Asia as well as East Asia, alleging that Washington was attempting to spark color revolutions and boosting support for Islamic terrorism in Southeast and Central Asia. Shoigu further stated that “[i]n the context of an unstable international situation, the strengthening of good-neighborly relations between our countries acquires particular significance. This is not only a significant factor in the states’ security, but also a contribution to ensuring peace throughout the Eurasian continent and beyond” (Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, November 18, 2014; Nezavisimaya Gazeta, November 20, 2014). According to Shoigu, “During talks with [Chinese defense minister] Comrade Chang Wanquan, we discussed the state and prospects of Russian-Chinese relations in the military field, exchanged opinions on the military-political situation in general and the APR [Asia-Pacific Region] in particular.” He added, “We also expressed concern over US attempts to strengthen its military and political clout in the APR. […] We believe that the main goal of pooling our effort is to shape a collective regional security system” (ITAR-TASS, November 18, 2014).
Defense Minister Shoigu’s words thus clearly point to Moscow’s efforts to initiate a working alliance with Beijing. On these grounds alone, the 2014 Russian Military Doctrine, which dictates just such a relationship with China, deserves more careful scrutiny by policymakers in the West.
--Stephen Blank
Regional Problems Ultimately Trump Ukraine as Defining Issue in Central Asia
Following Russia’s annexation of Crimea and its intervention in other parts of Ukraine, many in Central Asia and beyond concluded that the foreign and domestic policies of the five Central Asian countries would be radically and irreversibly changed by those events. Some saw Moscow’s actions in Ukraine leading the countries of that region to turn further away from Russia and seek expanded ties with the West or China in order to protect themselves against what many feared would be a Russian move against them. Other observers concluded that these countries would pursue the opposite strategy, seeking to protect their internal political arrangements by allying themselves even more closely with the Russian Federation (Interfax, April 4, 2014; The Moscow Times, March 19, 2014).
But those assumptions turned out to be wrong. In part, these notions largely failed to reflect the thinking of the elites in the Central Asian capitals. Even more importantly, however, five other influences, some new and some longstanding, trumped Ukraine as a defining issue in Central Asia. These five defining, long-term issues include the United States’ drawdown from Afghanistan, Chinese economic expansion, Russian economic power, intra-regional conflicts, and internal challenges to political control.
As a result, nine months after Moscow’s move into Crimea, the five countries of the region—Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan—are all following trajectories that they would most likely have chosen even if the Ukrainian crisis never happened. And this pattern is likely to continue unless there is some dramatic shift in Ukraine or in East-West relations in the coming months, or unless one or more of the five drivers of policy in Central Asia change.
What follows is a discussion that draws on year-end surveys of the countries in this region and in particular the comments of three prominent Russian experts: Stanislav Pritchin of the Moscow Institute of Oriental Studies, Dmitry Arapov, a historian at Moscow State University, and Aleksandr Salikhov, a Moscow historian who specializes in Central Asia (Novaya Gazeta, December 31, 2014).
The five drivers of Central Asia’s development are:
1. American Withdrawal From Afghanistan. The most important event in Central Asia last year was the US drawdown in Afghanistan. This development signified that the United States was less interested in Central Asia than it had been. At the same time a revived Taliban now threatens Central Asia and, beyond its borders, the Russian Federation as well. Such fears have not driven Central Asians toward cooperation with one another, however—there are too many longstanding conflicts among them (see below). Instead, these looming dangers have aroused greater concerns about unilaterally defending their own national borders and expanding cooperation with Russia to prevent challenges either from the Taliban to their security, or the West to their existing political arrangements (see EDM, July 12, 2013; February 26, 2014).
2. Chinese Economic Expansion. Chinese investment in Central Asia has skyrocketed, benefitting some of the countries in economic terms but sparking fears among the elites in many of them—and in Tajikistan in particular—that Beijing will follow up its economic expansion by seeking greater political influence. This potential rise in Chinese influence inspires local worry, especially given that the US is seen as retreating from the region and Russia is left as the only alternative as a counterbalance to China.
3. Russia’s Economic Power. The Russian economy is in terrible shape from the perspective of the West, but it looks very powerful indeed from Central Asia. As a result, Moscow analysts are unanimous that Vladimir Putin can expand the membership of his Eurasian Economic Union to include all the countries of the region, except Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan—and be successful in cultivating closer economic relations with Tashkent and Ashgabat as well. The reasons are rooted in geography: Besides northward transit through Russia, The Central Asian republics lack a sufficient alternative transit corridor for their trade. And with the US exit from the region, coupled with many of these governments’ opposition to China, the Central Asian states believe they are unlikely to obtain an alternative transit route out of the region any time soon. Furthermore, most of the Central Asian countries rely on transfer payments home from guest workers in Russia—a fact that no local leader can ignore, and something the Russian government can and does exploit to gain influence.
4. Conflicts Among the Five—Territorial and Political. The five Central Asian countries continue to fight over water, over territory—there are 286 disputed parts of their shared borders in the Ferghana Valley alone, and there are tensions over larger areas like Karakalpakia between Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan—and over pipelines and rail ways on which these countries depend for trade. Moreover, despite their Islamic heritage, the five have very distinctive national values that often put them at odds.
5. Internal Challenges to Political Control. Two of the five countries have aging leaders, two others face regional challenges to central control, and four of the five are worried that they will face challenges, from the Taliban or the West, to their authoritarian governments. Moscow is prepared to back these regimes uncritically in exchange for loyalty. That is something the West cannot or will not offer, even in the wake of the events in Ukraine. Thus, the policies of the five appear likely to continue along much the same paths they have in the past, the Ukrainian crisis notwithstanding.
None of this is to say that what is happening in Ukraine is not affecting the thinking of leaders in Central Asia. Instead, it is to point out the obvious that for them, as Arapov put it: “Ukraine is far away,” but Afghanistan, China and Russia are all nearby. Consequently, those factors more than Ukraine are going to define the future, at least the immediate one.
